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RECENT DECISIONS
CIVIL PROCEDURE -HABEAS CORPUS--EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES.
-In early 1946, Oliver Smith, a Negro boy eighteen years of age and of
limited education, was arrested in Virginia on a charge of robbery, convicted
and sentenced to a term of nine years. In June, 1946, he escaped from
the Virginia prison and was next heard of in New York in April, 1947,
when he pleaded guilty to a charge or robbery and was sentenced as a
second felony offender to a maximum sentence of fifteen years, five
years more than he could have been given had he been sentenced as a
first offender. Prior to July, 1955, Smith filed numerous petitions
in Virginia courts to have his 1946 conviction set aside, alleging that
before the conviction he had been held incommunicado for over a month,
was coerced and forced into giving a confession and pleading guilty when,
in truth, he was innocent, and that he was not represented by counsel nor
advised as to his rights to counsel by the court. The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, reviewing his petitions, found no jurisdiction to consider
the matter because the petitioner was not present in Virginia, and added
that there was no merit to his petitions. New York had no remedy whereby
a second offender could attack his out-of-state conviction for the first of-
fense. Smith also filed four petitions for habeas corpus in a federal district
court in New York, which were denied without hearing, but the district
judge granted a certificate of probable cause after dismissing the fourth
petition. On review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held, reversed and remanded to the federal district court for a
hearing on the merits. The petitioner alleged a substantial constitutional
claim which he could not, at that time, vindicate in the courts of any state.
Tliough one might ordinarily have forfeited his right to attack a state con-
viction by becoming a fugitive from justice from that state, "an untutored
eighteen year old boy, without benefit of counsel, could not have been aware
of what he was forfeiting by his flight."' United States ex rel. Smith v.
Jackson, 234 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1956).
Although the Constitution provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended,' there is no constitutional grant to federal courts of habeas
corpus jurisdiction as such. Article III does provide, "The judicial power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, [and] the Laws of the United States ...... It was on this basis that
habeas corpus jurisdiction is expressly conferred on the lower federal courts
by Congress in cases where the illegal restraint involves some question of
federal law."
'On petition for rehearing, alleging that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
had considered Smith's petition on the merits, held, petition denied. Since the Vir-
ginia court had no jurisdiction, its comments as to the merits were gratuitous, and
even if that court had rejected Smith's claim on the merits, still, certiorari having
been denied by the Supreme Court, petitioner had exhausted his state remedies and
resort to the federal district court was now appropriate. United States ez rel.
Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742, 749-50 (2d Cir. 1956).
'U. S. CNST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
'See 1 BARRON & HoTZOrFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 21 (1950) ; 1 id., § 21
(Supp. 1956). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1952) for present provisions. The Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, 1 STAT. 81, was passed to give affirmatively to the federal courtsjurisdiction to issue the writ. The Act of 1867, 14 STAT. 385, made the writ avail-
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The prerequisites for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction in cases where
a prisoner is held in state custody have always been two-fold: (1) It must
appear that "he is in custody in violation of the Constitution ...of the
United States . . .,"' and (2) he must have exhausted all available state
remedies prior to petitioning for the federal writ.' Prior to 1948, however,
the "exhaustion" prerequisite was uncodified.
The rule of "exhaustion of state remedies" has been explained by the
Supreme Court in terms of comity between the courts. When a state court
first secures jurisdiction there is a presumption that it will follow the law
of the land, and there is a delicate federal-state relations problem created if
a federal court intervenes before the state procedure has ended.! It has
also been submitted by at least one author that, habeas corpus being a
remedy for illegal detention, it would be a contradiction in terms to allow
it where another remedy has not been exhausted, and that certainly to re-
quire exhaustion of other remedies is no suspension of the writ in violation
of the Constitution.'
It early became apparent that an exception was necessary in cases of
special circumstances where to require exhaustion of state remedies before
allowing access to the federal procedure would work undue hardship and
effectually prevent vindication of fundamental rights. These were common-
ly referred to as "exceptional cases of peculiar urgency." Each case had
to be determined on its own facts, and only broad principles or classifica-
tions could be laid down to aid in determining whether a given case fell
into the exception.8
able to state prisoners, and eventually became the basis for a series of holdings that,
where a denial of a constitutional right was asserted, judgments of conviction by
state and federal courts could be reexamined on habeas corpus, and evidence outside
of the original criminal reoord taken on the question of violation of constitutional
rights. The acts of 1789 and 1867, along with two other acts (1833 and 1842) as
they affected habeas corpus, were codified in the REvl sED STATurIrs of 1874 and
1878, and, with the exception of the addition of the Supreme Court's appellate pow-
er, remained static until 1948. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 451-466 (1946). See generally
Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitutional Right or Legislative Grace?,
40 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 345, 349, 351-54 (1952) ; United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S.
205, 210-13 (1952).
'28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1952).
-28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952).
'Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 217 (1950) ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679-80;
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 671-72 (1948) ; Shapley v. Cohoon, 258 Fed. 752, 755
(D.C. Mass. 1918) ; Note, 49 MicH. L. REv. 611, 615-16 (1951).
'Collings, Habeas Corpus for Convicts-Constitational Right or Legislative Grace?,
40 CALIF. L. REv. 335, 358 (1952).
8Note, 34 MINN. L. REV. 653, 656-57 (1950). In Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118
(1944), the Supreme Court concluded that where a petitioner's resort to state court
remedies has failed to afford a full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions
raised, either because the state affords no remedy, or because in the particular case
the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inade-
quate [cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923) ], a federal court should entertain
his petition for habeas corpus, else he would be remediless. Compare Wade v.
Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684, 692-93 (1948) (dissenting opinion), with Washington v.
Smyth, 167 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1948).
In Boyd v. O'Grady, 121 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1941), where the facts were similar
to the instant case (except that the petitioner was not a fugitive), it was held that
if the allegationg of denial of counsel were true, the detention was unlawful and it
would be a "rare case of peculiar urgency" in which the federal court could enter-
tain the writ of habeas corpus, See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 US. 329 (1941).
[Vol. 18,
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Abuse of the writ of habeas corpus by convicts to test the "constitution-
ality" of their convictions was getting serious by 1942, and almost every
person convicted of a crime who was willing to take an oath that he had been
denied a fair trial could seek review by way of federal habeas corpus."
Therefore, the Judicial Conference of the United States appointed a com-
mittee to investigate and report on this problem. Its recommendations, for
the most part, were embodied in the 1948 revision of title 28 of the United
States Code. In this revision, the principle of exhaustion of state remedies
was codified for the first time."
Section 2254 imposes definite conditions as to the exhaustion of state
remedies. One of three requirements must be met before habeas corpus will
be granted by a federal court. They are: (1) The applicant must have ex-
hausted the remedies available in the courts of the state, and he will not be
deemed to have done this if he has the right, by any available state pro-
cedure, to raise the question presented, or, (2) he must show that there is
no state corrective process available to him or (3) that such, process is ren-
dered ineffective to protect his rights due to the existence of special circum-
stances.
From the wording of the statute it is apparent that the same factors
as before are to be considered in determining when the state remedies fail
to afford the petitioner a complete adjudication of his constitutional rights,
and the Supreme Court has held that section 2254 does not make the rule
of "exhaustion" inflexible.'
Thus it seems that the protection of a petitioner's constitutional rights
is uppermost in the minds of the federal courts. It would certainly follow
that no waiver' of these rights is to be lightly implied or presumed.' Any
9Parker, Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
-528 U.S.C. § 2254 (1952). Section 2254 was intended, among other things, to elimi-
nate, for all practical purposes, the right to apply to the lower federal courts for
habeas corpus in all states in which successive applications may be made for habeas
corpus to the state courts. Such successive application is not futile because it lays
the foundation upon which application can be made to the Supreme Court of the
United States for certiorari. Under this section, certiorari to the Supreme Court
is ordinarily one of the necessary steps in the exhaustion of state remedies. Cases
may arise, of course, where a lower federal court should be allowed to entertain the
petition, even though state remedies have not been exhausted, but this is taken care
of by the "special circumstances" section of the statute. For a more extensive dis-
cussion see Parker, &upra note 8. Judge Parker was the Chairman of the Judicial
Conference Committee which drafted the new Habeas Corpus Act. See also Darr v.
Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
"In Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1952), the Court stated that the general
rule is not rigid, and that district courts may deviate from it and grant relief in
special circumstances. Whether such circumstances exist calls for a factual ap-
praisal by the court in each special situation. Determination of thi's issue, like
others, is largely left to the trial courts, subject to appropriate review by courts of
appeal. See also Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 210 (1950) ; Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672,681 (1948).
'Waiver is generally defined as the voluntary relinquishment of a known right. 56
AM. Jurm, Waiver § 2 (1947). See also §§ 6, 9, 12.
z'Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental con-
stitutional rights and they do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938). See Von Moltke v. Gillies,
332 U.S. 708 (1948), for a discussion showing that the Supreme Court is suspicious
of any waiver of constitutional rights. OrFiELD, CmINAL PROCmDURn FROM ARREST
TO APPEL, 300 (1947).
1956]
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such "waiver" would have to be intelligently and voluntarily made by an
accused who knew the full legal effect of his actions.14
United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder? is analogous to the principal
case. There a petitioner sought, while imprisoned in the State of New York
as a second offender, to attack the constitutionality of his first conviction
in Wisconsin, where, he alleged, he had not been advised of his right to coun-
sel. He failed to attack the Wisconsin conviction until after his detention
in New York, at which time there were no state remedies available to him
as he was in the wrong state to raise them. Petitioner alleged that his fail-
ure to attack the first conviction sooner was due to the fact that he was not
advised of his right to do so. The court held that the failure of the relator
to attack the Wisconsin conviction until such time as he was unable to do so
by state procedure should not be regarded as a waiver or forfeiture of any
objection to his Wisconsin conviction, and that he had complied with section
2254 so as to entitle him to proceed in federal court.'
No cases have been found that answer in so many words the question
raised by the principal case as to how far federal courts will go in enter-
taining habeas corpus from a state prisoner who, by his own acts (i.e., by
becoming a fugitive from justice), has precluded himself from exhausting
the normally available state remedies. Nevertheless, it appears that the
requisite federal jurisdiction in cases of this type can be derived from sec-
tion 2254, following the doctrine of "exceptional cases of peculiar urgency"
developed by the cases prior to the 1948 amendment.
The court in the instant case, taking into account the age and intelli-
gence of the boy and the harsh treatment he had received, concluded that
there was no voluntary relinquishment of a known right which would con-
"The determination whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right (e.g.,
(to counsel) must depend, in each case, upon the peculiar facts and circumstances
surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the ac-
cused. The burden of proof is on the defendant to establish that he did not com-
petently and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464-65, 468-69 (1938). Failure to request counsel does not constitute a
waiver when the defendant does not know of his right to it. Uveges v. Pennsyl-
vania, 335 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1948). A plea of guilty is not a waiver of constitutional
rights if the defendant did not understand the consequences of such plea. Herman
v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956) ; Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949). A request for
counsel is not necessary to preserve the right. Tompkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485
(1944). See generally Annot., 149 A.L.R. 1403, 1409-16 (1944) ; 14 AM. Jur., Crimi-
n Law § 173 (Supp. 1955). In a case where a seventeen year old boy was ar-
raigned, convicted, and sentenced in one day after a plea of guilty to first degree
murder, with no advice as to his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court reversed
the conviction asserting, in essence, that the application, by the state court, of a
rule that a plea of guilty is a strong implication of a waiver of the right to counsel,
was error. DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947), reversing People v. De-
Meerleer, 313 Mich. 548, 21 N.W.2d 849 (1946). See also Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S.
786, 788-89 (1945) ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 474-76 (1945).
'183 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1950).
Cf. Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955), where it was held that a defendant in a
criminal prosecution who fled the state before indictment and did not file a motion
challenging the grand jury until long after the statutory time for filing had passed
had forfeited his right to do so. The Court stated, however, that they were not
holding that the act of fleeing and becoming a fugitive deprives one of federal
rights, but only that a state has an interest in prescribing time limitations for at-
tacking its inquisitorial process, and that the present case was not one in which
this interest must bow to essential considerations of fairness to individual defend-
ants.
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stitute a waiver. It then weighed the public and private interests to arrive
at the result that Smith had not forfeited his right to attack his Virginia
conviction by becoming a fugitive from justice.
The court considered that its decision might result in an increased flow
of habeas corpus petitions (which was one thing that the 1948 revision
sought to cut down) ; that the decision certainly would not deter escapes
from prison; and that it would be desirable that Smith's conviction be re-
viewed by a Virginia court or a federal court sitting in Virginia, which
would have a familiarity with the customs and practices in Virginia, enabl-
ing it better to evaluate the testimony and records. Against these considera-
tions stood the prospects that, if the court denied the petitioner's writ and
if Smith's allegations were true-a thing which could only be determined by
a hearing on the merits-an innocent man convicted of crime in violation of
substantial constitutional rights would unjustly suffer the severer penalties
meted out in New York to second offenders. Further a state court's laxity
in the protection of constitutional rightg would be sanctioned."
It would seem harsh and unjust under circumstances like those of this
case to apply a mechanical and inflexible rule so as to deny at least a hear-
ing on the merits. The federal district court may always deny relief after
the facts are considered.
But, would the decision in the case have been different if a few, half,
or most of the factors which the court considered in entertaining the peti-
tion had not been present? How substantial must be the constitutional
right which is claimed? Where is the dividing line past which a petitioner's
prior conduct will estop him from claiming that he has been denied a con-
stitutional rights? These questions, and others, remain to be answered.
JOHN F. BLACKWOOD
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW-
APPEAL BY INDIENTS.-Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in Illi-
nois. Immediately upon conviction they filed a motion in the trial court
asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic
transcript of the proceedings, be furnished them without cost, alleging that
they were "poor persons with no means of paying the necessary fees to
acquire the Transcript and Court Records needed to prosecute an ap-
peal. . . ." Under Illinois law it is necessary for a defendant to furnish a bill
of exceptions or a report of proceedings at the trial certified by the trial
judge in order to get an appellate review.' These are often impossible to pre-
pare without a stenographic transcript of the trial proceedings, and counsel
for Illinois did not deny that one was needed by petitioners. Indigent de-
fendants sentenced to death are afforded a free transcript, but the others
must pay for their own.' Upon denial of their motion by the trial court, the
petitioners filed under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act,' which pro-
'United States e.r rel. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1956).
'ILL. REv. STAT., C. 110, § 101.65 (Supreme Court Rule 65) (1955).
'ILL. REv. STAT., c. 38, § 769a (1955).
8ILL. Rsv. STAT., c. 38, §§ 826-32 (1955).
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